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Uniform Exceptions and Rights Violations 
 
Though the Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols address 
the proper responsibilities and expectations pertaining to nonuniformed 
combatants, there is still substantial disagreement on this issue, and 
rightly so. It is commonly argued that resource disparity or alternative 
sources of political legitimacy, such as national self-determination or the 
constitution of a political collective, justify the use of such unconven-
tional warfare. This article contends that nonuniformed combat is im-
permissible and its practitioners cannot be accorded full combatant rights 
under the rules of engagement, because of the manner in which this tactic 
endangers and infringes on the rights of genuine noncombatants. 
 Despite the disadvantages facing resource-poor groups, there are sev-
eral arguments against allowing nonuniformed combat (and by proxy, the 
relevant Geneva Conventions passages): 
 
(1) Nonuniformed combat morally infringes on civilians’ rights by forc-
ing them to participate in the fighting and thus unwillingly give up 
fundamental rights to immunity. 
(2) The coercion of civilians exacted by nonuniformed combat differs 
substantively from conscription, and is not acceptable as a lesser 
form of conscription. 
(3) This form of unofficial conscription fails to meet standards of trans-
parency, one of the requirements of a well-ordered society, because 
the conscripted civilians are unaware of what has happened to them. 
(4) Civilians are also morally prohibited from knowingly consenting to 
their own unofficial conscription. 
(5) The formation of a political entity by the nonuniformed combatants 
is not in and of itself enough for them to reap the benefits of legiti-
mate statehood. The collective good of behaving like a legitimate po-
litical entity does not permit their infringement on individual civil-
ians’ rights to refrain from fighting. 
 
Nonuniformed combatants come in several different categories. The pri-
mary focus of inquiry here is those who claim the full privileges of uni-
formed combat—namely, urban and rural guerrilla fighters who are usu-
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ally but not always nonuniformed (and who often qualify under the Ge-
neva Conventions’ First Protocol) and some groups of nonuniformed 
terrorists (sometimes classified separately as “illegal combatants” be-
cause they intentionally attack civilians). Military special forces and 
spies, who neither expect nor receive treatment as legal combatants, are 
assumed ineligible for POW protections, and instead rely on whatever 
deals they can get through ad hoc negotiations and agreements between 
applicable governments. As a consequence, the moral appropriateness of 
current legal code has little relevance to these groups. 
 
 
History of the Military Uniform 
 
Uniforms were not always common, and the practice of national militias 
wearing coordinated garb in the Western world is not a particularly old 
one, dating back only to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.1 Suc-
cessful European generals during this period paid painstaking attention to 
detail, including recruitment and training. Oliver Cromwell was one of 
the first to clothe his militia in uniform—its visual symbol buttressed the 
professionalization of the military and enforcement of discipline.2 Uni-
forms represented standardization as well as sovereign control.3 Even 
when impractical for movement, combat, or efficiency, such as certain 
versions of the British “redcoat” or some wildly extravagant and expen-
sive Napoleonic uniforms,4 those concerns were trumped by the impor-
tance of creating cohesion in the military and projecting an image of state 
power. Not surprisingly, systematic uniforming of soldiers coincided 
with the nation-state’s development, and has since become standard prac-
                                                 
 1Members of warrior classes all over the world have long worn distinctive armor and 
markings (e.g., crests, coats of arms, and other heraldry) to distinguish ally from enemy. 
Japanese shogunates were probably the first to clothe their armies in official uniform, 
requiring their samurai to wear the mon of their shogun lords as far back as the eleventh 
century; meanwhile, European knights wore their individual coats of arms or that of their 
religious orders into battle. Not until the mid-seventeenth century in Europe does Oliver 
Cromwell dress his army in uniforms, and the ensuing trend reaches its height with Fre-
derick the Great’s elaborate regalia in the mid- to late-eighteenth century. See Geoffrey 
Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West 1500-1800 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 71-72; Richard Holmes (ed.), The 
Oxford Companion to Military History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 
931-35; and Toni Pfanner, “Military Uniforms and the Law of War,” International Re-
view of the Red Cross, no. 853 (March 2004): 93-130, pp. 95-99. 
 2Extrapolated from Jeremy Black, War and the World: Military Power and the Fate 
of Continents, 1450-2000 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 209. 
 3Ibid., p. 132. 
 4Scott Hughes Myerly, British Military Spectacle: From the Napoleonic Wars 
Through the Crimea (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); and Emir Buk-
hari, Napoleon’s Hussars (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 1978). 




tice as well as synonymous with legitimate statehood in warfare. The 
influence of uniforms has been felt far beyond the European sphere and 
is codified in international military law. 
 Current international law on nonuniformed combatants, which this 
article considers reasonably representative of international moral opin-
ion, can be found in the Geneva Conventions.5 Article 44.3 of the First 
Protocol (1977) requires combatants to distinguish themselves from ci-
vilians (by wearing uniforms or by some other recognizable identifying 
mark) when engaged in or preparing for attack, but excepts “situations in 
armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed 
combatant cannot so distinguish himself,” and extends combatant protec-
tions to the nonuniformed so long as they carry arms openly in combat.6 
                                                 
 5The text of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols can be found at: 
http://www.icrc.org/web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/genevaconventions. 
 6“Article 44. Combatants and prisoners of war 
 1. Any combatant, as defined in Article 43, who falls into the power of an adverse 
Party shall be a prisoner of war. 
 2. While all combatants are obliged to comply with the rules of international law 
applicable in armed conflict, violations of these rules shall not deprive a combat-
ant of his right to be a combatant or, if he falls into the power of an adverse Party, 
of his right to be a prisoner of war, except as provided in paragraphs 3 and 4. 
 3. In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects of 
hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian popu-
lation while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to 
an attack. Recognizing, however, that there are situations in armed conflicts 
where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distin-
guish himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided that, in such 
situations, he carries his arms openly:  
    a. during each military engagement, and  
    b. during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a mili-
tary deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to participate.  
     Acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph shall not be consid-
ered as perfidious within the meaning of Article 37, paragraph 1 (c).  
 4. A combatant who falls into the power of an adverse Party while failing to meet the 
requirements set forth in the second sentence of paragraph 3 shall forfeit his right 
to be a prisoner of war, but he shall, nevertheless, be given protections equivalent 
in all respects to those accorded to prisoners of war by the Third Convention and 
by this Protocol. This protection includes protections equivalent to those accorded 
to prisoners of war by the Third Convention in the case where such a person is 
tried and punished for any offences he has committed. 
 5. Any combatant who falls into the power of an adverse Party while not engaged in 
an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack shall not forfeit his 
rights to be a combatant and a prisoner of war by virtue of his prior activities.  
 6. This Article is without prejudice to the right of any person to be a prisoner of war 
pursuant to Article 4 of the Third Convention.  
 7. This Article is not intended to change the generally accepted practice of States 
with respect to the wearing of the uniform by combatants assigned to the regular, 
uniformed armed units of a Party to the conflict. 
 8. In addition to the categories of persons mentioned in Article 13 of the First and 
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It does not address the circumstances qualifying for this exception, but 
the most common scenario (and the one that prompted this exception) is 
when one party is very resource-poor and/or lacks legitimate political au-
thority, such as an insurgent political subgroup. In these cases, a combatant 
is not required to distinguish himself in any way from civilians in order 
to retain all the rights and privileges of lawful combatants, provided that 
he “carries his arms openly” while engaged in or deploying for an attack. 
He is then exempted from charges of perfidy7 under Article 37.1.c for 
“feigning … civilian, non-combatant status.” It is implied that these cir-
cumstances are to be narrowly construed, as this exception “is not intended 
to change the generally accepted practice of States with respect to the 
wearing of the uniform by combatants assigned to the regular, uniformed 
armed units of a Party to the conflict.”8 All lawful combatants, uniformed 
or not, must adhere to the Conventions’ laws, but violations will not neces-
sarily deprive the combatant of his full complement of rights.9 Unlawful 
nonuniformed combatants (who do not carry their arms openly when re-
quired) forfeit their rights as POWs should they be captured, but will “nev-
ertheless be given protections equivalent in all respects to those accorded 
to prisoners of war by the Third Convention and by this Protocol.”10 
 The practical and legal viability of this law is complicated in its own 
right. First, it is not clear what carrying arms “openly” requires. Must 
one hold an AK-47 in one’s hands and akimbo to the body, or can it be 
strapped across the back? Even if arms are carried openly into combat, 
this would not be enough of a symbol in societies where everyone carries 
weapons.11 Furthermore, nothing is said about undercover special opera-
                                                                                                             
Second Conventions, all members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as 
defined in Article 43 of this Protocol, shall be entitled to protection under those 
Conventions if they are wounded or sick or, in the case of the Second Convention, 
shipwrecked at sea or in other waters.” 
 7Perfidy is defined as follows in the Geneva Conventions, First Protocol: 
“Article 37. Prohibition of perfidy 
 1. It is prohibited to kill, injure or capture an adversary by resort to perfidy. Acts 
inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, 
or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in 
armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence, shall constitute perfidy. The 
following acts are examples of perfidy: 
    a. the feigning of an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce or of a surrender; 
    b. the feigning of an incapacitation by wounds or sickness;  
    c. the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status; and  
    d. the feigning of protected status by the use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the 
United Nations or of neutral or other States not Parties to the conflict.” 
 8Geneva Conventions, First Protocol, Art. 44.7. 
 9Ibid., Art. 44.2. 
 10Ibid., Art. 44.4. 
 11In militarized societies (e.g., Afghanistan, Somalia), there are lots of weapons to be 
had and many people carry arms on a regular basis, regardless of military standing. This 




tions forces, although they do not expect or receive the rights of uni-
formed combatants. 
 But more serious problems remain. First, the language describing ex-
ceptional situations is imprecise and nondescriptive. The historical circum-
stances that led to the adoption of these articles are well known and their 
original intent is clear; Article 1.4 singles out “armed conflicts in which 
people are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and 
against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination.” 
In actuality, the regulations are so vague that they are obviously ripe for 
abuse. Because the terms are laden with historical baggage and quite in-
cendiary, they are often misapplied to suit the purposes of their users. Fur-
thermore, the circumstances only “include” these in particular, so exemp-
tions are not exclusive to anticolonial or antiracist movements. Anti-
globalization movements or rebellions over consistent poverty, for exam-
ple, could qualify since they can claim economic disparity. In addition, 
what motivation is there for everyone else to maintain the status quo when 
tempted with the advantages of nonuniformed combat? Article 44.7 tries to 
address this issue, but it is toothless in light of the vagueness of 44.3. 
 
 
Contemporary Purposes of the Uniform Convention 
 
The original objective of wearing uniforms was internal, to help impose 
discipline and professionalism on previously disordered militia and to 
                                                                                                             
is problematic for Geneva Conventions Art. 44.3, which relies on open arms to substitute 
for uniforms as martial identification. Wearing uniforms is really about visually identifying 
oneself in a manner that would be readily perceived by an observer, and this can encompass 
many things, including the unofficial uniforms of rebel groups. For example, rebels can 
wear distinctive colors, funny hats, or whatever piece of clothing so long as it is plainly 
displayed, it is obvious that such an item constitutes their “uniform,” and it is reasonably 
hard to accidentally wear that “uniform.” All three conditions must be met in order to serve 
that function. Carrying arms openly, then, may not be enough identification even in gener-
ally unarmed societies. Depending on their size and how they are carried, weapons and 
many common items (such as cell phones, wallets, tools, pipes, etc.) can easily be confused 
with each other under stressful circumstances requiring quick responses to perceived 
threats. It also matters whether one is fighting in urban or rural areas, and in what type of 
rural environment (heavy forests, open desert dunes, etc.). All these factors affect whether 
or not arms are adequate to differentiate soldiers from civilians, and more often than not, 
arms will not be enough. The “open arms” alternative is insufficient, as a general rule, to 
substitute for uniforms and to absolve nonuniformed combatants of this rights violation. 
This regulation should be made both stricter to eliminate the loophole of “open arms” and 
broader to embrace a less pomp-and-circumstance-influenced definition of “uniform.” Such 
broadening would eliminate the need for any exceptions that deem “open arms” sufficient. 
 Whenever this article refers to uniforms, it does not limit them to full regalia. It in-
cludes any acceptable standardized identifying markers that a resource-poor group could 
adopt as an alternative to full uniform dress. 
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help solidify loyalty to the sovereign from mercenary fighters. While this 
rationale still applies, the primary motivation behind wearing uniforms 
has changed. It must have quickly become obvious that wearing uni-
forms disadvantaged the soldiers in them, particularly when moving 
through civilian populations. Yet, the expectation that this convention 
would be honored has persisted. It is incorrect to think that warfare has 
only recently spread to civilian-populated areas and that, previously, sol-
diers could wear uniforms with impunity. In fact, soldiers have always 
fought among or near civilians, yet the uniform’s evident drawbacks 
have not overcome over three hundred years of this practice—certainly 
long enough to have figured out its hardships. 
 Why would such a detrimental convention persist? The uniformed 
soldier allows himself to be recognized as such, even though it makes 
him an easier target, for several reasons. One of the most compelling is 
utilitarian: because wearing uniforms makes it easier for soldiers and 
civilians to tell each other apart, it prevents soldiers from hiding among 
civilians and helps reduce accidental civilian casualties. Second, it en-
courages clumping for protection. A single, readily identified soldier 
would not want to be caught alone in hostile territory. This helps keep 
soldiers away from civilians, further reducing civilian risk, and keeps 
wars between soldiers. 
 Although overall utility is increased by obeying a uniform conven-
tion, individual soldiers are disadvantaged. Other reasons have emerged 
to reinforce the tradition and to combat the natural tendency of every 
individual to abandon his uniform, including an element of reciprocity. 
Soldiers wear uniforms, thereby making themselves vulnerable, because 





Despite this convention, refusal to wear uniforms persists and receives 
official international sanction. In addition to the three historical reasons 
for requiring uniforms (nationalism/sovereign control, utilitarianism, re-
ciprocity), this article suggests a fourth, one that fits well into the con-
temporary moral climate—the right to immunity. The purpose behind 
noncombatant immunity and the practice of wearing uniforms is not 
uniquely or best explained by utilitarian, egalitarian, or nationalistic in-
terests. In contemporary times, it is more plausibly explained by a robust 
concern with rights that is common to deontological liberal theories. 
While they differ on exactly how they would defend this right to immu-
nity, they all agree that civilians come to the table with an assumption of 
immunity and cannot be unduly deprived of it. 
 To demonstrate this “overlapping consensus” on civilian immunity, I 




sketch two different deontological liberal ways of getting to this conclu-
sion—self-ownership and the integrity of the person—and argue that the 
right to civilian immunity can only be surrendered by becoming a soldier 




At the core of any liberal’s convictions, no matter what his particular 
strand, are the beliefs that there is a natural right to self-ownership and 
that bodily violations constitute a special category of wrong. The concept 
of ownership in the self, which can be traced back to Locke, is now often 
called “control self-ownership,”13 and: 
 
[it] consists of the rights of use and exclusion, the power of transfer, and an immunity 
from expropriation with respect to one’s own body and labor power, with these incidents 
being held permanently and in rem (i.e., against the world).14 
 
Control self-ownership is motivated by the inviolability of the person and 
the desire to protect individual autonomy. John Christman writes: 
 
What matters in self-ownership … is individual rights to control oneself—to no interven-
tion in use [of one’s talents]. The specific motivation behind self-ownership involves the 
strong interest that I have in running my own life. If the state or other entity tells me 
when and where I must utilize my abilities—forcing me to produce this or preventing me 
from producing that—something deep and fundamental is sacrificed.”15 
 
Control self-ownership is “arguably the complete liberal conception of 
self-ownership,”16 meaning that liberals of any stripe can and should en-
                                                 
 12This “overlapping consensus” of deontological liberal agreement on civilian immu-
nity can be supplemented by a consequentialist “liberalism of fear.” According to Judith 
N. Shklar in “The Liberalism of Fear,” in G.W. Smith (ed.), Liberalism: Critical Con-
cepts in Political Science (New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 91-106, “Liberalism has 
only one overriding aim: to secure the political conditions necessary for the exercise of 
personal freedom” (p. 91). This minimalist liberalism is a method of securing “freedom 
from the abuse of power and intimidation of the defenseless” (p. 96), and seeks only to 
prevent fear “created by arbitrary, unexpected, unnecessary, and unlicensed acts of force 
and by habitual and pervasive acts of cruelty and torture performed by military, paramili-
tary, and police agents in any regime” (p. 98). This would require making civilians im-
mune from attack in times of warfare. 
 13Control self-ownership was first developed by John Christman in “Self-Ownership, 
Equality, and Structure of Property Rights,” Political Theory 19 (1991): 28-46; and The 
Myth of Property: Toward an Egalitarian Theory of Ownership (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1994). 
 14Robert S. Taylor, “Self-Ownership and the Limits of Libertarianism,” Social The-
ory and Practice 31 (2005): 465-82, p. 468. 
 15Christman, “Self-Ownership, Equality, and Structure of Property Rights,” p. 39. 
 16“Control self-ownership is either explicitly or implicitly endorsed by John Christman, 
James Grünebaum, [and] Andrew Kernohan,” says Taylor (“Self-Ownership and the Limits 
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dorse this definition without amendment or reservation. This results in 
liberal agreement on some domestic policies, namely that forced labor 
such as “Good Samaritan” laws and corvée labor should be prohibited.17 
Internationally and in the context of a war, the basic right of exclusion 
with respect to one’s own body and its corresponding duty of noninter-
ference are tantamount to civilian immunity. Unless a person somehow 
gives up his right of exclusion—for example, by enlisting—a soldier vio-
lates that right by attacking him. The immunity that each civilian starts 
(and most end) with in wartime equates to having permanent rights of 
exclusion over his own body. 
 
Integrity of the person 
 
One of the Rawlsian basic liberties is integrity of the person, which in-
cludes “freedom from psychological oppression and physical assault and 
dismemberment.”18 Like control self-ownership, physical and psycho-
logical integrity is grounded in a right to one’s natural assets19—here, 
one’s body. Rawls, however, offers a more complicated apparatus to jus-
tify this integrity as a basic right. Inherent in an individual’s equal liber-
ties are the possession of a free internal life and the freedom to revise and 
alter one’s own ends. These, in turn, are feasible only when accompanied 
by the possibility of self-respect.20 All of this would be meaningless and 
impossible without the aforementioned physical integrity. So people have 
a fundamental interest in the integrity of their own person and would 
want to guarantee its priority from behind the veil of ignorance.21 In the 
same manner as with control self-ownership, the priority of physical and 
psychological integrity translates into civilian immunity as the default 
condition on the international stage and in the context of war.22 
 
 
                                                                                                             
of Libertarianism,” p. 474). It plays an even larger role in libertarian thinking, e.g., Robert 
Nozick and Murray Rothbard. See Christman, “Self-Ownership, Equality, and Structure of 
Property Rights,” p. 39; James Grünebaum, Private Ownership (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1987), p. 171; and Andrew Kernohan, “Rawls and the Collective Ownership 
of Natural Abilities,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (1990): 19-28, p. 22. See also 
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), and Murray 
Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1982). 
 17Taylor, “Self-Ownership and the Limits of Libertarianism,” p. 472. 
 18John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1999), §11, p. 53. 
 19Ibid., §17. 
 20Ibid., §§32, 33, 82. 
 21Ibid., §§26, 39. 
 22The constraints of nonideal theory on the moral principles of nonuniformed combat 
are directly addressed below, in the section “Voluntary assumption of risk by civilians.” 




Giving up civilian immunity 
 
When a war begins, status quo ante for all individuals is civilian standing 
with immunity from attack and the right to be protected. Legally, some 
of them become combatants and acquire military standing with respect to 
their own governments, by virtue of exchanging their right to immunity 
for the right to kill opposing combatants and thus making those killings 
acceptable wartime deeds rather than murders. The right to not be at-
tacked is forfeited through an intentional exchange. It is the only way a 
civilian can give up his immunity, and in contemporary times, this is the 
understanding that noncombatants have when they become combatants.23 
Killing in combat is therefore a legitimate action because of rights ex-
changes by combatants who knowingly choose to enter the arena of war. 
 The conditions under which civilians can give up or lose their immu-
nity are very specific and restricted, and they preclude the possibility of 
nonuniformed combat. Soldiers relinquish their right to not be killed in 
exchange for the right to kill other soldiers. Civilians, on the other hand, 
retain their right to immunity but are obligated to not interfere with the 
activities of soldiers, whether by hindering or helping.24 A person can 
readily move from one category to the other and back again without re-
striction, provided circumstances are reasonable and the distinction is not 
being exploited, for example, not in the middle of a battle. 
 What is going on here is a multifaceted contract between soldiers and 
their governments with a very limited scope (the realm of war), which 
                                                 
 23There are actually two separate agreements. The first is the exchange of civilian 
immunity for the right to kill. In the second, between combatants and other governments, 
the former trade their right to immunity for later protections as POWs (who are not 
deemed to have murdered and are not held responsible for the political actions of their 
governments) if they are captured on the battlefield. 
 This relationship between combatant and POW status is also noted by Helen Kinsella, 
“Discourses of Difference: Civilians, Combatants, and Compliance with the Laws of War,” 
Review of International Studies 31, Suppl. S1 (2005): 163-85. Kinsella tries to explain 
why the Bush administration was so particular about abiding by Geneva Convention 
regulations for the civilian/combatant distinction but much less so about the ones provid-
ing protections for POWs held at Camp X-Ray in Guantanamo Bay. But she does not 
consider that all the combatants who did not receive full POW protections were suspected 
of engaging in nonuniformed terrorism. These nonuniformed combatants did not ex-
change their rights in good faith. They claimed all the rights of killing in war, without 
accepting any of the burdens or responsibilities (including protecting civilians and wear-
ing uniforms). They sought to retain civilian immunity through their dress while still 
demanding protection as POWs. This clearly violates the terms of the exchange. 
 24There is, of course, a gray area between unquestionable combatants (e.g., soldiers 
on the front line) and unquestionable noncombatants (e.g., babies), which includes non-
combatants who contribute to the war effort in some substantive way, e.g., workers in 
military munitions factories, military medical personnel, workers in food and agricultural 
sectors supplying the military, or civilian transporters of military supplies. 
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results in different statuses for everyone. Soldiers accept the disadvantages 
of wearing uniforms on the understanding that their opponents do so as 
well, with the intention of protecting civilians from both sides by clearly 
signaling their status. It is bolstered by an underlying and reinforcing 
agreement between governments (currently via the Geneva Conventions) 
to give uniformed soldiers certain rights and protections as befitting their 
positions as government representatives (and not as independent, individ-
ual agents), and to discourage violation of the soldier/ civilian distinction 
by categorizing and treating nonuniformed combatants differently. 
 This agreement is not only between soldiers and their governments, 
however, but a three-way understanding between soldiers, governments, 
and civilians.25 Civilians have a right to immunity from attack as well as 
the responsibility to refrain from fighting or unduly obstructing it (e.g., 
wandering into and disrupting the course of a battle, purposefully or not). 
The soldier/civilian distinction cannot work without agreement, coopera-
tion, and reinforcement from all three parties (civilian, soldier, and gov-
ernment). 
 The parameters of noncombatant immunity form the basis of the uni-
formed combatants’ rights. Combatants agree to exchange their right to 
immunity for a right to kill with the understanding that conditions for 
engagement in war will be fair and reciprocal. One such condition is that 
each combatant will wear a uniform and thus identify himself as some-
one who has exchanged his rights. By intentionally forgoing the attire of  
                                                 
 25At first glance, the following diagram appears to resemble the famous Clausewitz-
ean trinity: people, army, and government. This is a misconception of trinity, however. 
Clausewitz says that the dominant tendencies in war are a “wonderful trinity” of “the 
original violence of its elements, hatred and animosity, which may be looked upon as 
blind instinct; of the play of probabilities and chance, which make it a free activity of the 
soul; and of the subordinate nature of a political instrument, by which it belongs purely to 
reason” (Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Colonel J.J. Graham (London: N. Trübner, 
1873), http://www. clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/VomKriege2/ONWARTOC2.HTML, 
§I.i.28), which often get simplified to “emotion, chance, and reason.” Clausewitz contin-
ues: “The first of these three phases concerns more the people; the second more the gen-
eral and his army; and the third more the Government. The passions which break forth in 
war must already have a latent existence in the peoples. The range which the display of 
courage and talents shall get in the realm of probabilities and of chance depends on the 
particular characteristics of the general and his army; but the political objects belong to 
the Government alone.” 
 Several contemporary interpreters—including Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: A 
Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, Cal.: Presidio Press, 1982); and John 
Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Knopf, 1994)—have mistakenly identified the 
trinity as the people, army, and government. Clausewitz, however, clearly refers to the 
people, army, and government as the primary—though not exclusive—exemplars and 
manifestations of the trinity’s elements, and not the trinity itself. For more, see Christo-
pher Bassford and Edward J. Villacres, “Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity,” Parame-
ters 25, no. 3 (1995): 9-19. 








? Civilians do not interfere with Governments’ soldiers. 
? Civilians do not pretend to be Soldiers. 
? Governments enforce protection of Civilians and 
Civilians’ right to immunity by punishing Soldiers 
and Civilians who violate agreement.
? Soldiers are limited representatives of 
their own governments, and immune from 
individual responsibility for their gov-
ernments’ political decisions. 
? Soldiers wear uniforms and take precau-
tions to protect all Governments’ Civil-
ians. 
? Governments give their own Soldiers the 
legal right to kill other Soldiers (so these 
acts are not murder). 
? Governments give other Governments’ 
Soldiers full POW rights, incl. fair treat-
ment and not holding them individually 
responsible for their Governments’ politi-
cal actions.* 
? Governments enforce the Soldier/Civilian 
distinction by punishing cheating parties. 
*This covers soldiers in standard relationships to governments, though it also has 
implications for stateless individuals who act outside of the authority of a state’s rec-
ognized military. Those fighters could not possess the right to kill soldiers or to be 
treated in accordance with established international military conventions for POWs. 
? Soldiers exchange right to immunity for right to legally kill other Soldiers. 
? Soldiers wear uniforms in order to identify themselves to other Soldiers—
they cannot pretend to be Civilians.
? This three-sided relationship is reciprocal and logical, and their terms all go to-
gether. There cannot be one without the others. 
? Civilians and Soldiers who violate their terms of the agreement erode Civilians’ 
right to immunity and Soldiers’ rights as special Government representatives. 
? A second dimension can be laid on top of this, to represent the contracts that Gov-
ernments have with each other to treat enemy citizens in particular ways. 
? Soldiers wear uniforms to 
remain identifiably separate. 
? Soldiers take on special re-
sponsibilities to not harm Ci-
vilians, as appropriate. 
? Civilians cannot interfere with 
Soldiers’ activities. 
? Civilians cannot pretend to be 
Soldiers. 
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recognizable uniforms or distinctive emblems—the only practical way to 
reasonably identify someone as a soldier or civilian on the battlefield—
nonuniformed combatants violate their agreement, and their eligibility for 
protections under conventional laws of war subsequently becomes ques-
tionable.26 Requiring uniforms has the undeniably important instrumental 
effect of helping to protect noncombatants—but if its benefits can be 
shown to be negligible, a consequentialist case can be made that wearing 
uniforms should be unnecessary for receiving full combatant protections. 
 The ability to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants, 
however, also has significant deontological implications; these stand 
separately from utilitarian doubts and apply even if they are assuaged. 
The tactical advantage gained by nonuniformed combat hinges on the 
fact that one’s opponent generally respects modern uniform conventions 
during combat, namely, that he wears his uniform and mistakenly ex-
pects you to wear yours. It is a deliberate strategy used expressly to blend 
in with the protected civilian population, and when fighters do not wear 
uniforms, they implicitly force civilians to participate in the fighting. 
 Because of their similar appearances, a soldier cannot practically dis-
tinguish between his nonuniformed enemy and a civilian. This leads the 
soldier to view all persons as potential combatants—an entirely reasonable 
and expected response—even as he continues to pursue only the combat-
ants, albeit with greater care and at greater risk to himself. But as a result, 
civilians are unwillingly drawn into the fighting, because they often find 
themselves in the vicinity of and mistaken for nonuniformed combatants. 
Whether or not they take up arms to defend themselves, civilians in this 
situation are unwittingly forced to become combatants, thus compromis-
ing the autonomy of those who have chosen to refrain from fighting. 
 This involuntary surrender of civilian immunity differs from govern-
ment conscription into military service, because civilians in the former 
situation are unaware of their new status as combatants or their concomi-
tant rights and responsibilities. So in addition to the rights violation, it 
fails to meet standards of transparency. One requirement of a just, well-
ordered society, according to Rawls, is that it satisfy the demands of pub-
licity, one of which is that the principles regulating society are made 
                                                 
 26In Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977), Michael Walzer makes a 
similar claim, saying that guerrilla fighters “violate the implicit trust upon which the war 
convention rests: soldiers must feel safe among civilians if civilians are ever to be safe 
from soldiers” and that when murder or assassination is committed in war, as guerrilla 
warfare might be called in some circumstances, the assassin cannot claim protection from 
the laws of war even if the deed was justified (pp. 182-83). This article goes further, by 
making explicit the structure that supports this implicit trust, adding the role of the gov-
ernment and proposing a complex three-way relationship, and explaining the foundations 
for civilian immunity that lie at the base of this structure. 




public and everyone accepts and knows that others also accept them.27 
There is nothing wrong per se with a military draft so long as everyone 
knows that it exists and what the terms are, that is, who would be drafted 
and the conditions under which one might be called on to serve, but it 
violates transparency requirements when one is oblivious of having been 
pressed into military service. It is unreasonable to ask civilians to assume 
unawares a status that comes with such unique and serious risks of injury 
and death, and equally unique and serious responsibilities. It is one mat-
ter to ask citizens to risk life and limb in conscious service of the state, 
but another entirely when they are essentially conscripted without their 
knowledge. 
 Soldiers who do not wear uniforms violate their obligation to protect 
civilians and try to have the best of both worlds—retain a right to immu-
nity while acquiring the right to kill legally. Repeated and sustained 
cheating, by either civilians or combatants, will gradually and inevitably 
erode the sanctity of civilian status in that particular conflict, and will 
ultimately lead to serious consequences on the battlefield. Uniformed 
soldiers, even if they try to continue treating civilians with special care, 
will be forced to assume that civilians might be nonuniformed enemy 





The next sections tackle some of the more prominent counterarguments 
in favor of allowing a nonuniformed exception for certain groups, and 
explain why they fall short. 
 
“Weapon of the weak” 
 
The changing nature of warfare (notably, unprecedented asymmetries in 
military power) is often given as a reason for exception. Proponents of 
                                                 
 27In “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” Rawls actually sets forth three levels 
of publicity: (1) of the principles of justice themselves; (2) of the methods of inquiry and 
reasoning used in reaching the principles (including science, common sense, etc.); and (3) 
of the entire mechanism of justification for the principles of justice, which may include 
some additional methodologies. See John Rawls, Collected Papers (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 303-58, at pp. 324-25. 
 28In the current Iraq conflict, the U.S. has been fastidious about maintaining the civil-
ian/combatant distinction, more so than just about every other country in the world. 
American soldiers are ordered to abide by that regulation even when engaging an enemy 
that regularly disguises itself as civilian, and the U.S. government backs up its beliefs and 
intent by prosecuting cases of civilian death more often than cases of torture. But even this 
attention lavished on maintaining the sanctity of the civilian can only withstand so much 
when it is constantly battered by the reality of sustained exploitation on the battlefield. 
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nonuniformed combat often justify their strategy as a “weapon of the 
weak,” because they lack resources relative to their better-organized and 
better-equipped opponents. 
 But whether military asymmetries are merely technological or inclu-
sive of political, diplomatic, and economic resources, they are nothing 
new, so proponents of this justification cannot rest their claims on the 
novelty of these disparities. Either the laws of warfare should never have 
required uniforms of anyone, or the differences in ability have no bearing 
on the matter at hand. For as long as people have fought each other, there 
have been glaring gaps in the ways of war. On the technological front, 
the most obvious examples of battlefield asymmetry come from the in-
troduction of firepower. The Ottoman use of siege artillery (including 
cannons and mortars that fired 155-180 shots per day) greatly contributed 
to their victories in the siege of Modon29 in 1500 and in a 1526 battle at 
Mohacs against Luis II of Hungary’s cavalry. When Aztecs and Incas 
were first confronted with firepower by Spaniards in the same century, 
they fared worse than their European counterparts had against the Otto-
mans.30 Akira Kurosawa’s The Seven Samurai (1954) provides a more 
poignant example; though the samurai prevail against gun-wielding ban-
dits in this instance, the film points to the impending end of the samurai’s 
way of life and warfare. Technological disparities are not limited to in-
novations in firepower. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Por-
tuguese navy enjoyed many advantages—their ships’ hull construction and 
lateen and square rigging, as well as navigational tools and knowledge—
that translated into military benefits whether or not those ships carried 
cannon.31 This is no different from the advantages afforded to modern air 
forces that possess stealth fighters, vertical-landing jets, and Predator 
drones. Superior firepower accounts for only part of the technological gap. 
 One can go back further to the battle of Agincourt (1415), for a strik-
ing example of advanced technology. Henry V’s brilliant leadership was 
aided by horrible tactics from the French, but the English’s ability to de-
feat a force more than four times the size of their own had probably even 
more to do with their use of longbows. This battle is often cited as one of 
the major developments in the history of military technology, but the 
French were hardly lacking in absolute terms. Their force, about 25,000 
strong, was comprised largely of well-equipped and heavily armored 
men-at-arms, including some cavalry.32 
                                                 
 29Modon is known as Methone or Methoni by the Greeks. This battle is also referred 
to as the Second Battle of Lepanto, in the Ottoman-Venetian war of 1499-1503. 
 30Black, War and the World, pp. 26-29. 
 31Ibid., pp. 26-27. 
 32For an excellent account of the Battle of Agincourt, see John Keegan, The Face of 
Battle (New York: Viking Press, 1976), chap. 2. 




 The Agincourt scenario raises a couple of important questions. First, 
how large does the gap need to be to qualify for using “weapon of the 
weak” strategies? There was not that much of a technological difference 
between the two sides at Agincourt. The longbow was a critical devel-
opment, but the gap between the longbow and, say, the crossbow or the 
sword is not nearly as large as the difference between the stealth bomber 
and the AK-47. Yet, few would call the French “weak” or even signifi-
cantly disadvantaged, and certainly, no one would justify the French re-
sorting to nonuniformed combat in order to rectify that disadvantage. 
 That leads to the second question: Why does the playing field, or bat-
tlefield, need to be perfectly level? It is not, after all, a chess game where 
artificial constraints endow both sides with equal material resources at 
the beginning. In fact, the point of war is to determine who has the ad-
vantage and/or to gain the upper hand. The “weapon of the weak” argu-
ment is actually premised on an empirical claim about battlefield dispari-
ties, not a moral claim, and as such, it does not respond to the question at 
hand. It starts to sound as if proponents of this “weapon of the weak” 
strategy want to level the playing field for its own sake. Perhaps they 
believe that doing so would rectify other wrongs (e.g., economic oppres-
sion or racial discrimination) perpetuated in the past against the groups 
represented by the nonuniformed combatants, by reversing the inequali-
ties in the military arena. While the technological gap obviously affects 
military outcomes, it may not be the deciding, or even the most impor-
tant, factor in either the long- or short-run, which is why the “weapon of 
the weak” argument can also be understood more broadly, to include po-
litical and economic weakness. In the best-case scenario, a group has 
gone to war only because it has not been able to achieve its desired re-
sults through the political and economic venues in which it is also lack-
ing. Relative weakness in military capabilities and battlefield resources, 
then, is a reflection of a broader, systemic incapacity. 
 These political and economic weaknesses are affected by a host of 
other elements, for example, being a nomadic versus an agrarian society 
or lacking previous exposure to deadly diseases.33 Jared Diamond’s Guns, 
Germs, and Steel argues quite convincingly that the military advantages 
(including guns, steel swords, mounted animals, diseases/immunities, 
oceangoing ships, and advanced political organization) possessed by 
Europeans (Western Europeans, especially) that allowed them to conquer 
almost all of the rest of the world were actually a result of superior food 
production and related technologies and the development of writing. Those 
in turn resulted from the particular sets of available domesticable native 
                                                 
 33Notably, a host of European diseases such as measles and smallpox nearly deci-
mated the Native Americans before they ever met on the battlefield. 
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animal and plant species, which were then spread along east-west axes 
across landmasses. Because of similar climates latitudinally, the east-west 
axis is much more conducive than the north-south axis to the spread of 
plants, animals, and technologies.34 (Diamond’s argument is grand theory 
—more or less compelling for specific eras on specific continents, but very 
convincing as an explanation covering the seven-million-year history of 
man.) As this or other similar theories suggest, military inequalities are 
the consequence of a mass of longstanding, complex factors and histori-
cal developments—battlefield capacities are merely a symptom. 
 Underlying political and economic inequalities need to be addressed 
at their source rather than with their manifestation. Blending into civilian 
populations gives nonuniformed combatants not only tactical parity but 
moreover tactical advantage, and in fact, defenders of nonuniformed 
combat often erroneously assume that the primary cause of not wearing 
uniforms is resource poverty rather than a tactical decision to violate ci-
vilian rights in order to gain an advantage in combat. (Many guerrilla 
groups have and regularly wear uniforms for the same reasons that offi-
cial state soldiers do—to foster unity and a sense of identity and pur-
pose—yet choose to not wear their uniforms in battle.) 
 It seems unreasonable to subsequently give the formerly disadvan-
taged group an advantage. While disadvantages suffered in the past may 
well contribute to present military inequalities and should somehow be 
rectified, it is unfair to force the presently advantaged soldiers to atone 
for asymmetries of old or for their governments’ political and economic 
attainments by giving their current counterparts an advantage. The per-
sons involved are different, and present individuals should not be held 
responsible for past injustices in this way. This is not to say that the 
asymmetrical situation should not somehow be addressed. But once a 
war has already begun, it is the wrong time and wrong arena to tackle 
what is really a larger problem.35 Rather than put civilians at undue risk 
by allowing the disadvantaged special tactics, rebel groups in the right 
should be able to make claims on foreign aid, so they can remedy their 
weakness in both the broad and technological senses. Underlying ine-
qualities behind battlefield asymmetry are best rectified, if at all, not on 
                                                 
 34Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1997). 
 35On the practical side, making exceptions based on relative political or economic 
weakness is difficult to regulate. Every time there is a conflict, it must be determined not 
only which side is weaker but also how much the stronger side should be handicapped, 
based on who in particular is fighting. This raises many other questions: How much are 
political and economic disparities worth in terms of battlefield strategy? What about in 
close cases, where the two sides are not too unevenly matched? What is the threshold gap 
necessary for receiving special dispensation? How will this be determined before the 
conflict starts? Who will make these decisions? 




the battlefield, but at their roots. In trying to right what is actually a 
symptom of a “wrong,” nonuniformed combat merely trades one 
“wrong” for another, which creates additional wrongs by endangering 
innocent civilians. And this “wrong,” battlefield inequality, is not really a 
wrong—it is a factual inequity, not a moral mistake. 
 
Scale and scope of modern warfare 
 
It may be that the nature of contemporary warfare—its increased scale 
and scope, along with more urbanized fighting and far- and wide-
reaching weaponry, impact greater numbers of civilians than ever be-
fore—rather than the lack of uniforms is to blame for the proliferating 
number of civilian casualties. Whether its proponents like it or not, the 
inevitable implication of this argument is that because civilian deaths 
resulting from nonuniformed combat are negligible in comparison with 
those from other causes, perpetrators of nonuniformed combat should be 
given a pass because others commit grosser injustices. 
 Regardless of the truth of this argument, it is irrelevant to the question 
at hand—whether nonuniformed combat is unjust and whether it should 
be allowed. Carpet bombing, the use of “daisy cutters” or nuclear weap-
ons, embargoes, or any number of other tactics may directly or indirectly 
lead to a thousand or even a hundred thousand times more civilian deaths 
than nonuniformed combat does, but they do not detract from the claim 
that nonuniformed combat leads to some unjust civilian deaths. It would 
be no different if a person were to declare that driving while intoxicated 
seriously impairs one’s motor functions and causes many traffic-related 
deaths and, given the cost-benefit calculation of imposing such a law, 
should therefore be banned, and someone responded, “You know that not 
wearing seat belts causes lots of deaths, too.” While not entirely unre-
lated, it does not address the point that has been raised.36 
                                                 
 36Moreover, it is not clear that this claim—that the nature, weaponry, and tactics of 
modern warfare have increased civilian deaths—is even true. There is widespread dis-
agreement not only about the absolute numbers of civilians killed, but also about the 
relevant trends and ways of evaluating that information. Scholars dispute whether civilian 
casualties have increased or decreased as a result of modern warfare. (For example, see 
Bethany Ann Lacina, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Bruce M. Russett, “The Declining Risk 
of Death in Battle,” International Studies Quarterly 50 (2006): 673-80; and Meredith 
Reid Sarkees, Frank Whelon, and J. David Singer, “Inter-State, Intra-State, and Extra-
State Wars: A Comprehensive Look at Their Distribution over Time, 1816-1997,” Inter-
national Studies Quarterly 47 (2003): 49-70.) Some argue that the broad scope and larger 
scale of modern war and the rising use of air power, coupled with development of greater 
firepower and more deadly weapons of mass destruction, have led to more civilian casual-
ties than ever before. On the other hand, the advent of a uniform convention and new laws 
against harming civilians, as well as the greater accuracy of weapons, have certainly de-
pressed the number of civilians who would otherwise have been killed. A New York Times 
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 More compelling would be the following three-part claim: (1) while 
wearing uniforms may have some marginal effect of decreasing the num-
ber of civilian casualties, the practice is not as useful in reducing civilian 
deaths as is often thought; (2) so wearing uniforms results in only a small 
gain in overall utility that does not outweigh the costs it imposes on al-
ready militarily disadvantaged groups; therefore (3) requiring this prac-
tice is not justified. 
 The problems with this argument are that, first, it is of questionable 
veracity, and second, it is utilitarian at core. It weighs the net utility 
gained when uniforms are not required against the net utility when uni-
forms are mandated, and finds that the former is greater than the latter. 
But besides obvious problems with measuring utility in these situations 
(which would include measuring utility on the battlefield against any 
future gains and losses away from it), any utilitarian argument like this 
does not consider that civilian utility might receive more weight than 
soldier utility, and necessarily disregards the rights of immunity and their 
corresponding responsibilities belonging to both soldiers and civilians 
during war. 
 
                                                                                                             
graphic on technological advancements in war presented fascinating statistics from the 
U.S.’s major wars, from World War I through the present, including the cost of the wars, 
precision-guided weapons as a percentage of total weapons, number of sorties flown, and 
total number of American soldiers killed in battle. Perhaps the most telling is the number 
of sorties required to hit a 60' x 100' building: World War I: N/A; World War II: 3,024; 
Korean War: 550; Vietnam War: 44; Persian Gulf War: 8; current Iraq war: 1 (“A Nation 
at War: A Historical View,” New York Times, 20 April 2003, B16). 
 The first problem in determining which way casualties are trending is counting them. 
The dangers and disruptions of war make it difficult to get accurate numbers. Further-
more, casualty reports can be intentionally inaccurate, while some deaths often are not 
counted, e.g., deaths from landmines after the conflict ends or from the spread of disease 
exacerbated by the war, or other conflict-related mortality (see, e.g., Aldo A. Benini and 
Lawrence H. Moulton, “Civilian Victims in an Asymmetrical Conflict: Operation Endur-
ing Freedom, Afghanistan,” Journal of Peace Research 41 (2004): 403-22; Hazem Adam 
Ghobarah, Paul Huth, and Bruce Russett, “Civil Wars Kill and Maim People—Long 
After the Shooting Stops,” American Political Science Review 97 (2003): 189-202; and 
Debarati Guha-Sapir and Willem Gijsbert Panhuis, “Conflict-Related Morality: An 
Analysis of 37 Datasets,” Disasters 28 (2004): 418-28), and separating some of those out 
as direct results of war can be difficult. There are good datasets available on war deaths, 
however, including Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta 
Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand, “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset,” Journal of 
Peace Research 39 (2002): 615-37. 
 Even with the right numbers, what is the relevant way to interpret them? The number 
of civilian casualties does not tell the whole story. Total absolute numbers might be inter-
esting, but ultimately they are not very useful. Rather, civilian casualties need to be 
counted in the context of other people involved—perhaps as the percentage of total casu-
alties or as percentages of civilians or total people (soldiers included) affected by the 
fighting—and then compared across time periods, according to type of war, and so on. 




Formation of a political entity 
 
It is often the case, however, that rights come into conflict, and some 
have to give way. Justifications for nonuniformed combat might be made 
in various ways on the basis of group rights. One such argument is of-
fered by Christopher Kutz, who claims that when a group of nonuni-
formed combatants forms a valid political unit, it possesses the relevant 
moral authority to behave as the equivalent of a state and so should re-
ceive the full rights of uniformed combat.37 
 But constitution of a viable political entity and its concomitant rights 
are not enough to trump the moral infringement of civilians’ rights. The 
value of such a political union does not outweigh that of individual 
goods, even though the unfortunate side effect may be to favor well-off 
regimes or forces.38 Exemption from uniformed combat should not be 
made on the basis of political cohesion, and individuals cannot be forced 
to unknowingly give up their rights to remain civilians, even in the face 
of a collective good.39 
 Kutz argues that the formation of a collective entity is crucial, and 
general combat privilege is grounded in 
 
the relation of individual combatants to a collective decision to go to war. That relation is 
a matter of individual commitments to the collective: their mutual orientation around 
each other as fellow agents in a collective project. If an essentially intentional relation 
among individuals grounds the privilege, then the privilege ought logically to be extended 
to any who together constitute a collective at war, whether or not they are uniformed.40 
 
A subgroup within a state may constitute a viable political entity by vir-
tue of forming an essentially Rousseauean republic.41 Kutz claims that 
                                                 
 37In “The Difference Uniforms Make: Collective Violence in Criminal Law and 
War,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (2005): 148-80, Christopher Kutz does not think 
of this puzzle in terms of competing rights because he never addresses the question of 
bystander rights, but this article tackles his argument in that light. 
 38This argument differs from the statist case against legitimizing nonuniformed com-
batants—that statehood is the only conferrer and recipient of moral status in the interna-
tional realm. 
 39This argument also has obvious implications for the acceptability of legitimate 
states whose soldiers engage in nonuniformed combat. 
 40Kutz, “The Difference Uniforms Make,” p. 176. 
 41Kutz parts ways with Rousseau on the implications of forming such a republic. 
While Rousseau abstracts people’s soldiering from their citizenry and says that they in-
teract only as soldiers, Kutz thinks that Rousseau’s argument should lead Rousseau to say 
that they come into conflict as citizens. Nonetheless, Kutz uses the Rousseauean republic 
as the underlying premise for his argument, and this calls into question his arguments 
about political subgroups forming a Rousseauean republic. The standards for forming a 
Rousseauean republic and for participating in the General Will are so demanding that it 
would be almost, if not definitely, impossible to form such a political entity in this day 
and age. A genuine Rousseauean republic requires contracting all of one’s liberties to the 
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wearing a uniform is “ultimately window-dressing” because it is external 
evidence of internal collective organization within a larger political 
community, and that the evidence itself is “not constitutive of such or-
ganization or ties.” For example, says Kutz, a unit of undisciplined mer-
cenaries could be well-uniformed.42 
 While collective organization is necessary, it is insufficient to warrant 
special status as a legitimate warring entity. Kutz recognizes this, and he 
adds that not all groups of individuals would receive protection—only 
“political groups engaged in violence in support of political goals, in the 
sense of aiming at creating (or restoring) a new collective ordering, can 
rightly claim the privilege.”43 In other words, the group must be trying to 
become a state or something comparable. Says Kutz, whether a group’s 
violent acts count as political or criminal depends on three factors: (1) 
existence of internal ordering (the group must be capable of regulating its 
own conduct by the laws of war); (2) the character of its aims (it must be 
a project of national liberation or self-determination, as stated in the Ge-
neva Conventions’ First Protocol); and (3) achievement of some degree 
of success on the ground.44 Kutz acknowledges that the last criterion is 
problematic because it is difficult to define and measure. Even if one 
were to agree on what to measure, for example, popular support or terri-
torial gain, how much is enough? In addition, the real test of legitimacy 
is recognition, and achieving that may take time.45 
 But if it is entirely the political relationship within a group that grants 
rights of nonuniformed combat and if uniforms are really just “window-
dressing,” then legitimate states should also be permitted to engage in 
nonuniformed combat, as they clearly meet Kutz’s standards for collec-
tive political organization. Perhaps all states could be allowed to inten-
                                                                                                             
sovereign and putting oneself and all of one’s powers under the direction of the General 
Will, which is much more than the sum of everyone’s desires, with each member as an 
indivisible part of the whole. The sovereign then holds a fiduciary relationship with the 
government. Rousseau emphasizes the subordination of the latter to the former, because 
for him, the sovereign is an existing, actively acting body that meets regularly and fre-
quently to make laws, dismiss governments, and so on. No representation is allowed in 
the sovereign—direct citizen participation is required in lawmaking. This is necessary to 
reinforce patriotism, reduce corruption, and realize the General Will. A Rousseauean 
republic’s demands are so stringent that it is unlikely that one could ever have been con-
stituted, and even more improbable today. In addition, Kutz’s requirement of popular 
support would further dilute the General Will and the republic’s cohesion, as this type of 
republic is possible only among a very small group of isolated people. A political rela-
tionship of this sort, then, is not a plausible basis on which to rest a claim to collective 
political organization and a subsequent right to nonuniformed combat. 
 42Kutz, “The Difference Uniforms Make,” p. 165. 
 43Ibid, p. 176. 
 44Ibid., pp. 176-77. 
 45Ibid., p. 177. 




tionally send their soldiers into battle without uniforms, not only the rela-
tively disadvantaged sides in the conflict. But Kutz would not allow 
this—he would reserve that privilege for economically or militarily dis-
advantaged nonstate groups, provided they are engaged in a just war.46 If 
that is the case, then it is not the political relationship that this privilege 
hinges on. Although collective organization is necessary, it is really the 
relative disadvantage that Kutz is after, and as such, his claims might be 
reducible to a “weapon of the weak” argument. At the very least, by giv-
ing only nonstates the privilege of practicing nonuniformed combat, he is 
conflating nonstate status with nonuniformed combatant privilege. 
 Setting that aside for the moment, assume that some group unequivo-
cally meets all three of Kutz’s criteria and its members therefore receive 
full combatant rights and responsibilities without wearing uniforms. Al-
though he is right about uniforms being external constitutive symbols, 
Kutz forgets that this external symbol serves a very important function, 
which is to protect the rights of civilians. Regardless of how legitimate the 
collective polity is, the act of not wearing uniforms conflicts with the 
rights retained by civilians to not be forced to participate in fighting and to 
not give up their immunity. This is not a mere instrumental consideration. 
 While there is some merit to an argument about the political legiti-
macy of these subgroups, if not Rousseauean, it is still an open question 
whether that warrants granting the exception. This article has argued that 
nonuniformed combatants infringe on the rights of civilians by forcing 
them into a moral position that they did not choose or accept. The impli-
cation of Kutz’s claim—that being a successful political group fighting 
for liberation exempts one from wearing a uniform—is that such a rights 
violation is permissible; Kutz never tackles this issue, however. 
 Obviously, infringement on one’s moral standing is permissible in 
some cases, such as killings in self-defense against innocent attackers.47 
Briefly, the problem of the innocent attacker poses a moral dilemma be-
cause Person A is in a position to be killed by Person B (through no fault 
of Person B’s) and A must kill the innocent B if A wishes to survive. The 
hypothetical scenarios range from more to less outrageous, complete with 
ray guns and force shields (though, oddly, never any decoder rings or 
golden lassos), but the core question is the same and the conclusion is gen-
erally accepted—killing B in self-defense, innocence notwithstanding, in-
fringes on B’s rights, but the action is both regrettable and permissible. 
 Nonuniformed combat differs significantly, however, even though the 
civilian could be seen as an innocent bystander of sorts who finds him-
                                                 
 46Ibid., p. 156. 
 47See, for example, Jeff McMahan, “Self-Defense and the Problem of the Innocent 
Attacker,” Ethics 104 (1994): 252-90. 
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self in harm’s way through no fault of his own. In the innocent attacker 
scenario, B is the primary object of the killing, and once A kills B in or-
der to save himself, the scenario ends. In a combat scenario, the nonuni-
formed combatant is the primary object of the killing, while the innocent 
civilian is a secondary and accidental object of the killing. Put another 
way, A is the uniformed soldier who is trying to kill B, the nonuniformed 
and noninnocent combatant, while a new person, C (the civilian), is in-
troduced into the scenario and it is the innocent C who is accidentally 
killed instead. And the scenario does not end when B or C is killed, be-
cause there are still other nonuniformed combatants and suspect civilians 
all around. The uniformed combatant must assume this, as he cannot dis-
tinguish between the civilian and the nonuniformed combatant. 
 Ultimately, the formation of a political group is not enough to justify 
granting a uniform exception. Coordination of and membership in politi-
cal society, as well as political society itself, are moral goods; but within 
the hierarchy of political goods, collectively held goods sit below indi-
vidual ones—in this case, the individual goods from civilians’ retaining 
their rights to immunity. Furthermore, political society and the resulting 
“political solidarity” are nothing approximating a Rousseauean society. 
A Rousseauean republic is highly unrealistic in the modern world, if it 
was ever otherwise; so unfortunately for Kutz, the constitution of a Rous-
seauean republic is not a viable reason to allow groups to fight without 
uniforms while receiving all the privileges of uniformed soldiers. Al-
though it does require participating in a cohesive political enterprise with 
others and sharing in its burdens and benefits, in reality, political society 
creates much less stringent bonds. Those who do participate derive from 
the society a political identity of citizenship that is unique to their soci-
ety. While this political identity is necessary for the legitimacy of a po-
litical entity, it is still insufficient, because there are any number of other 
things a political entity must have, such as an established political struc-
ture and political and legal institutions, however rudimentary. The mere 
formation of a political entity does not in itself confer the full benefits 
and responsibilities of a legitimate political being, even if the bonds 
forming the political entity are legitimate. 
 Furthermore, although political solidarity and political identity are 
primary goods, they rely on the existence of and participation in a collec-
tive entity and are themselves collective goods.48 Therefore, they should 
                                                 
 48Political solidarity and the understanding of political identity should be included in 
the list of primary social goods, albeit as collective rather than individual ones. There is 
essential value derived from jointly participating in a cohesive political enterprise and in 
sharing the burdens and benefits thereof. Individuals’ identities and choices are shaped in 
large part by their societies’ institutions of justice and by their political and moral educa-
tion, all of which reflect their political systems. The reason for including political solidar-




fall below individual primary goods in a liberal’s lexical ordering of pri-
mary goods (e.g., the four individual primary goods of self-respect, basic 
liberties, opportunities, and income, à la Rawls), and perhaps below other 
individual goods as well. This is because of liberalism’s emphasis on 
moral individualism, which emerged in opposition to the group-centered, 
corporatist morality of feudalism. Group-focused political theories such 
as civic humanism (see, e.g., Rousseau and Arendt) emphasize civic vir-
tue and the necessity of constant participation in public affairs in order to 
live “the good life,” and they therefore value public goods over private 
ones. Rawlsian political liberalism, on the other hand, denies that public 
life is necessarily central to an individual’s conception of the good—it 
could or could not be—for it is the individual’s decision whether he 
wishes to adopt the public good as his personal one.49 Liberalism in gen-
eral carries with it a “presumption” in favor of individual liberty, whether 
in choosing one’s plans of life or conceptions of the good, so any inter-
ference with that must meet certain qualitative thresholds. The formation 
of a political entity alone, as opposed to a legitimate state with necessary 
institutions, should not be enough for liberals. According to this hierar-
chical ordering of primary goods, complete freedom is not given to col-
lective action, and the collective good does not take priority over indi-
vidual ones. Giving nonuniformed combatants the full benefits of uni-
formed combatants, even provided that they meet a particular threshold 
of political formation, says in effect that collective goods take prece-
dence. 
 This is not to say that collective rights never play a role. On the con-
trary, they serve a very important function in the realm of war, because 
                                                                                                             
ity in the list of primary goods is similar to the reasons social contract theorists restrict 
the contract to within a single society. To his list of primary social goods—basic liberties, 
income and wealth, and opportunities for office and position (A Theory of Justice, §11)—
Rawls later adds self-respect as the most important primary good, because no pursuit of 
endeavors or plans of life will be meaningful without a sense of self-worth (§67). All of 
these social primary goods are just that—social. Individuals in a society, even adherents 
of minority cultures within it who might be granted exceptions, are involved in a coop-
erative enterprise that is bounded by the borders of their particular system and institutions 
of justice. These primary goods are not meaningful outside of the context of society. Op-
portunities for office and position obviously require a society in which to hold them, and 
even the idea of a right to liberty and some material resources only makes sense when 
there are others who compete for them or can curtail them for you. Without other people, 
or with only very few, it would resemble a Rousseauean state of nature, in which one 
might infrequently come across another person but there would not be any serious com-
petition with him for resources or space. In that situation, rights are not really necessary 
or meaningful. So it is the existence of societies that gives these goods context and mean-
ing. Any agreement about international principles of justice, then, would want to protect 
political association to some degree, so political solidarity needs to be added to the list of 
social primary goods. 
 49John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 
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only through the constitution of a political state can soldiers derive the 
right to legitimately kill each other as representatives of their states, 
rather than as individual, criminal murderers. Political entities have a 
mediating role in warfare, meaning that the state can allow its citizens to 
legitimately perform acts that would otherwise be disallowed under do-
mestic governance, notably, engage in war and kill other people. It does 
not, however, trump all other goods. Someone who is not a recognized 
citizen of a state or other governing body is in a state of nature with re-
spect to other individuals in the world. This has ramifications for what 
duties others owe to him. For example, stateless individuals or citizens 
who fight outside the authority of their state’s recognized military could 
not possess the right to kill soldiers, or the right to be treated in accor-
dance with established international military conventions for POWs. The 
government may very well choose to treat such a person like other sol-
diers anyway, but for reasons other than duties imposed by this battle-
field exchange—for example, promoting pragmatic self-interest, foster-
ing good public relations, straightforward compassion, or recognition of 
his personhood. 
 
Public goods and implicit compulsory service 
 
Probably the most compelling case for the legitimacy of nonuniformed 
combat, and for granting nonuniformed combatants the full complement 
of military rights, can be made with a public goods argument. To be clear, 
no one currently offers this justification in defense of nonuniformed com-
bat. But if there were a compelling case to be made, this would be it. 
 Providing traditional public goods50—for example, security, a justice 
system, or transportation infrastructure—is an expensive undertaking. 
They must be financed somehow, and compulsory service and taxation 
are standard ways of doing this.51 The state is justified in collecting vari-
                                                 
 50Pure public goods are both nonrivalrous (once provided, the additional resource 
cost of another person consuming the good is zero—it does not add to the costs for provi-
sion or reduce the effect on others) and nonexcludable (preventing others from consum-
ing the good is either very expensive or impossible, short of expelling them from the 
community, because the good benefits everyone within the boundaries). Examples in-
clude lighthouses or city holiday displays. Public goods need not be provided by the gov-
ernment or a public agency—they can be supplied through the private sector, e.g., by 
contractors. See Harvey S. Rosen, Public Finance, 6th ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill Irwin, 
2002), chap. 6, “Public Goods.” Very few goods are purely public: most are more nonri-
valrous than nonexcludable, or vice versa, e.g., the atmosphere is rivalrous (there are 
competing uses for air, e.g., someone could dump a lot of pollution into the air that would 
affect others’ breathing) but nonexcludable, while viewing a privately owned painting in 
a giant mansion is nonrival but excludable. 
 51See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, trans. Maurice Cranston (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1968), Book III, Chapter 15. 




ous taxes or requiring physical labor, for example, mandatory military or 
civil service, jury duty, or voting. 
 Nonstate groups that control significant swathes of territory often 
similarly provide public goods. Suppose there is a revolutionary group—
let us call it “PFJ”—engaged in a protracted struggle with its state that 
regularly disregards the uniform convention for strategic advantage, con-
trols territory in the country in question, and effectively governs that area 
in a parallel quasi-state. Within that territory, PFJ provides the traditional 
public goods of security (against government forces) and policing, as 
well as systems of justice, education, healthcare, and other services. De-
fense and justice are both ways of deterring aggression (foreign or do-
mestic) that could potentially affect anyone within the group’s protected 
territory. This deterrence is at once nonrivalrous and nonexcludable, and 
thus a public good. Like states, PFJ must finance its operations some-
how, which it does in various ways, from more traditional taxes and la-
bor to less traditional drug smuggling or money counterfeiting. 
 PFJ can also be seen as providing a nontraditional public good of or-
ganizing and conducting a revolution. This is not normally considered a 
public good, but insofar as it is beneficial to the population (i.e., it will 
lead to a better form of government), everyone in that country would 
benefit from this nonrivalrous and nonexcludable good.52 
 Because PFJ provides public goods (be they defense and justice or 
revolution), it is arguably similarly entitled to gather resources through 
taxation and compulsory service. It lacks official international recogni-
tion but, as a public good-providing entity nonetheless, PFJ must resort 
to implicit mandatory military service from the population to bolster what-
ever official conscription it can muster. This requires not wearing uniforms 
and thereby spreading some of the combat risk to the civilian population. 
 When its fighters refuse to wear uniforms, the PFJ can be seen to de-
mand an unusual kind of compulsory service. Making it difficult or im-
possible for others to distinguish PFJ from civilians effectively con-
scripts all adult males, who now bear a (greater) risk of being mistaken 
for a combatant, and injured or killed. This provides an indirect benefit 
for PFJ fighters, whose risk is reduced in a complementary way, as they 
can more effectively blend in with the local population, stage ambushes, 
and so on. 
 So one might argue: if PFJ is genuinely providing public goods and if 
any such (state/equivalent) provider can justifiably do the same through 
                                                 
 52It is still an open question whether the revolution is a public good or a public bad. 
Much like the status of feudal lords, it is unclear whether it is more beneficial than para-
sitic and exploitative. For the sake of presenting the most compelling argument in non-
uniformed combat’s favor, this article assumes the revolutionary movement to be a public 
good. 
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conscription and/or taxation, then PFJ’s refusal to wear uniforms can be 
seen as providing such goods on the cheap, via a weak form of the mili-
tary draft. What prevents PFJ from officially drafting more conscripts is 
its own institutional weakness—it cannot effectively organize or afford 
to maintain a large army of conscripts, so it retains a smaller army of 
conscripts and volunteers, then buttresses its numbers and efficacy by 
effectively conscripting the rest of the adult male population through its 
refusal to wear uniforms much of the time. All adult civilian males there-
fore become possible PFJ members, yielding the obvious benefits for PFJ 
and the obvious detriments for civilians. Just as terrorism can be seen as 
asymmetric warfare for the weak, a refusal to wear uniforms or openly 
bear arms (standard guerrilla warfare) can be seen as local public-goods 
provision by the organizationally challenged, via wide conscription. PFJ 
would like to draft far more people, but it cannot manage that, so it offi-
cially drafts some, then effectively drafts the rest. 
 This scenario is hardly far-fetched in real life. For example, the 
FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), a Marxist-Leninist 
guerrilla rebel movement that claims to represent the rural poor against 
government and wealthy classes, can be seen as running a quasi-state by 
virtue of providing services (public goods)—traditional public goods of 
security (against government and paramilitary forces) and policing, and 
rudimentary systems of justice (through extrajudicial “revolutionary 
courts”), education, healthcare, and other services, and the nontraditional 
public good of revolution53—in the part of the country it controls, espe-
cially since the Colombian government effectively ceded some 42,000 
sq. km. in southern Colombia to the FARC between 1998 and 2002.54 
FARC must finance its operations and services somehow and, indeed, it 
relies on some of the same strategies as states do. In addition to receiving 
foreign assistance, it imposes “taxes,” especially on all stages of illegal 
drug trafficking activities, and conscripts locals to serve as fighters in 
order to provide internal and external security. 
 FARC regularly capitalizes on norms of soldier-civilian distinction in 
the pursuit of strategic advantage in this conflict. Its uniform is the same 
bland green camouflage that all the parties (state army, police, right-wing 
paramilitaries, left-wing guerrillas) wear, occasionally embellished with 
                                                 
 53One can quibble with designating such unofficial governance as a public good, as 
the FARC could and probably do exclude some people within their territory from protec-
tion—no different from painting some people green and announcing to criminals that 
they are fair game. 
 54See “FARC,” Encyclopædia Britannica (2007), http://search.eb.com/eb/article-
9398098; and “An Honest Citizen—Handbook: Colombia’s Civil Warriors,” WIDE AN-
GLE PBS Series (2005), produced by WNET/Thirteen, directed by Angus Macqueen, 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/shows/colombia/handbook2.html. 




a variation on the Colombian national colors in their insignia and arm-
bands. Much of the time, however, FARC prefers civilian dress in order 
to blend in with the larger population and has reportedly attacked and 
kidnapped civilian targets. It also commonly disappears into and occu-
pies villages, forcing civilians who live there to quarter them. If asked 
whether or not their actions are justified in the context of the soldier-
civilian distinction in the rules of war, FARC could respond with some-
thing like the following: “We are fighting for these people [the civilians 
in these rural villages], protecting them from the government and para-
military forces, and risking our lives to change things for them, so they 
need to help us in exchange, by housing us, hiding us. We are doing all 
this for them, after all.” Although FARC does not put it in those terms, 
such an explanation would amount to a public goods argument.  
 Why is this improper behavior, and why does the public goods argu-
ment ultimately fail? First, it is an open question whether PFJ or FARC is 
providing a public good, as opposed to a public bad. For the sake of ar-
gument, let us suppose that it is a good, but a strong case can be made for 
this revolution being a public bad, given the disruption and damage caused 
to civilian lives by the revolution’s fighting and questionable tactics. 
 Second, it is only acceptable to impose taxes or conscription on non-
consenting people when the imposing party is a legitimate state or the 
equivalent thereof. In a state or state-equivalent, the people hypotheti-
cally consent to rule in general by the governing entity, even if they dis-
agree with particulars like a certain tax code or the regulations for con-
scription. While FARC’s status as a state-equivalent fulfills one of the 
necessary conditions that allow it to conscript, it must also be domesti-
cally legitimate. It is unclear whether FARC has done enough to legiti-
mate its governance, given its terrorist tactics, forced (overt) conscrip-
tions, kidnappings, and so on. Given this, it may not be able to lay claim 
to legitimate statehood or quasi-statehood.55 
 Third, not wearing uniforms is successful as a military tactic only be-
cause it relies on and exploits the civilian/soldier distinction, the wide-
spread reluctance to kill civilians, and the mutual understanding of civil-
ian immunity. Such infringement on civilians’ moral rights will eventu-
ally lead to the practical erosion of civilian immunity on the battlefield. 
Fourth, this kind of weak or unofficial conscription—by blending in with 
civilians—is not on a par with official drafts. The so-called “conscripts” 
are unaware of what is happening to them, their new status as pseudo-
                                                 
 55In addition, though public goods can be provided by private entities—e.g., by gov-
ernment subcontractors or by independent, private agents providing private charitable 
funds, open source software, or beautifully maintained gardens on front lawns of private 
homes—it does not follow that those private entities are then entitled to collect taxes or 
demand compulsory services. 
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combatants, or the terms of conscription. Again, this does not meet the 
standards of transparency and publicity. Now suppose FARC simply an-
nounced to everyone that some of its soldiers were not going to wear uni-
forms and civilians were therefore at risk. While everyone would know 
what was happening and this move would satisfy standards of publicity, 
there is still another problem that unofficial conscription cannot over-
come. What official conscription can do (even if it does not always) that 
unofficial conscription cannot is achieve discrimination among classes of 
people. For example, official conscription can select able-bodied males 
of a certain age, while unofficial conscription must “draft” everyone at 
once—young, old, and handicapped included. Such indiscriminate con-
scription is not something that people would hypothetically consent to, 
even if it were done by a legitimate government. 
 Finally, just because one is allowed to perform an action “A” does not 
mean it is similarly acceptable to do anything that is prima facie “<A.” 
Assuming that it is morally permissible to execute someone, it does not 
follow that amputating his arm, for example, is also allowed. One might 
say, “Surely it is less bad to cut off the person’s arm—he would at least 
be alive, which is certainly better than being dead, and he himself would 
prefer to have his arm cut off than to be executed.” But that is not neces-
sarily the case. In the situation at hand, the ability of a state to conscript 
officially (in the strong sense) does not inevitably make it acceptable for 
the state to conscript unofficially (in the weak sense) by having its sol-
diers not wear uniforms. 
 To understand this, killing and coercion must be distinguished. Bar-
bara Herman writes: 
 
Although many violent acts are coercive …, it will not do to claim that killing is a limit-
ing case of coercion. A coercive act aims at the control of a person’s will; killing does not 
(at least not of the will of the person killed). In killing, someone is prevented from doing 
anything at all, but he is not made to do something against his will. There is a significant 
difference between threatening pain or twisting your arm (or even threatening to kill) to 
keep you from joining the opposition party and killing you to achieve the same result. 
The coercive act looks to alter what will happen by controlling what an agent wills. In 
killing, the victim is not prevented from doing something—the killing prevents some-
thing from happening. Killing (and noncoercive violence in general) poses a moral prob-
lem that needs to be kept separate from that of coercion.56 
 
For rational beings for whom the exercise of autonomy is supreme, coer-
cion can be worse than straightforward killing. The latter simply stymies 
the will and prevents it from acting, while the purpose of the former is to 
subvert and control the will, forcing it to act in a way it would not have 
                                                 
 56Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1993), p. 119. 




chosen, accepted, or endorsed. 
 This type of violent manipulation of the will is a gross failure of the 
respect due to an autonomous agent and is worse than simply killing the 
agent. Killing the agent does not necessarily infringe upon nor is it nec-
essarily directed toward his moral autonomy. (Mere) violence is directed 
primarily at the body and only secondarily at the agent, since the body 
houses the agent.57 Coercion, on the other hand, is a direct attack on 
agency, and it cannot be universally willed without contradiction in con-
ception or will. In addition, coercion undermines the “possibility of co-
ordinated free human activity,” to use Herman’s language,58 which is the 
desired moral foundation of all human interaction. Therefore, “<A” is not 
always acceptable if “A” is. Coercion stems from a failure of respect for 
the rational autonomous agent, and this manipulation of the will is worse 
than simply thwarting the action of the will. 
 Soldiers who do not wear uniforms put civilians at risk in a way that 
turns the latter into de facto soldiers without them knowing it. This is 
veiled coercion. Although being possibly-a-soldier poses less danger to a 
person than if he were straightforwardly conscripted as an official sol-
dier, the manner of this weak so-called “conscription” uses deception in 
order to manipulate the civilian’s will, unbeknownst to him, and is thus 
worse than actual conscription. This tactic fails to respect people’s moral 
autonomy, equally so whether it is done by a state or a quasi-state. 
                                                 
 57Herman calls violence an attack on the “conditions of agency”: “Unlike coercion or 
deception, which involve assault on the integrity of willing itself, the object of violent action 
is not the will but a person’s body. (Threats of violence and threats involving violence are 
other matters.) Coercion involves an attack on agency; violence, an attack on its conditions. 
Although violent actions usually prevent an agent from doing what he wills, they do not 
(they cannot) control willing. The agent in the hands of violence has his will obstructed, 
as he would if the general circumstances of his action turned recalcitrant. This is why a 
world of universal violence is conceivable” (The Practice of Moral Judgment, p. 126). 
 Herman’s argument is not without controversy or problems. The first is that insofar 
as Kantian theory has been developed for rational autonomous agents in human form, a 
body is a necessary condition of agency. Should other rational autonomous beings pos-
sessing all the relevant traits but without bodies be discovered, that would be a different 
matter, but as it currently stands, bodies are required. This problem does not deter us 
from making the distinction between targeting the will and targeting the vessel of the 
will, however. 
 A more interesting problem is that preventing someone from doing X and manipulat-
ing someone into doing Y may actually fall along the same continuum, rather than being 
entirely different actions. There are many ways to manipulate, directly or indirectly, and 
one way to coerce someone into doing Y would be to lay down obstacles to doing not-Y. 
For example, one wishes to force a person to walk the path from A to B, when he really 
wants to head to C. Landmines can be laid everywhere except from A to B, and mines 
placed behind him as he moves. Lay down enough obstacles, and preventing not-Y starts 
to look like forcing Y. 
 58Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment, p. 127. 
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Voluntary assumption of risk by civilians 
 
What about cases in which civilians implicitly or explicitly consent to 
rebel use of nonuniformed combat—that is, they willingly forfeit their 
rights to immunity without taking on combatant privileges? This might 
happen if they feel their lives are currently so oppressive and worthless 
that they are willing to accept the dangers and heavy casualties to them-
selves from nonuniformed combat in the hopes that it will secure them 
better lives in the long run. 
 When civilians forfeit their immunity, however, they automatically 
become combatants and, in this case, nonuniformed ones. With immunity 
comes responsibility, not just privilege. By agreeing to be put into 
harm’s way as a civilian decoy with an understanding of the battlefield 
effects (increased difficulty for opponents in telling civilians and soldiers 
apart), these individuals are reneging on their responsibilities to refrain 
from influencing the battle’s outcome; so even if they surrender their 
privilege to kill enemy soldiers, they are no longer civilians. 
 Second, in cases in which the consent is thought to be implicit, an 
individual cannot so part with this right to civilian immunity, although it 
might appear at first that he can. After all, says Rawls, “it may be neces-
sary to forgo part of these [basic] freedoms when this is required to trans-
form a less fortunate society into one in which all the basic liberties can 
be fully enjoyed.”59 Liberty may be restricted for its own sake.60 More 
specifically, “it seems possible to consent to an unequal liberty only if 
there is a threat of coercion which it is unwise to resist from the stand-
point of liberty itself.”61 This is exactly the circumstance described, that 
the only way to improve an oppressed civilian’s nonideal situation—in 
which his liberties are already severely curtailed—is to give up his right 
to physical integrity (i.e., civilian immunity) by accepting nonuniformed 
combat in the hopes that the rebels will secure him fuller liberties in the 
future with a victory against the oppressive regime. Nonideal conditions 
can be countenanced if they are both temporary and instrumentally valu-
able in creating a world in which ideal theory applies. 
 For the sake of argument, let us assume that giving up rights to civil-
ian immunity would help the rebels win and that they would institute a 
regime in which basic liberties are better protected. Even then, a civilian 
may not give up his immunity in this way. Nonideal theory, and therefore 
allowance of nonuniformed combat, must meet the following three con-
ditions:62 
                                                 
 59Rawls, A Theory of Justice, §39, p. 217; see also §11. 
 60Ibid., §39, p. 214. 
 61Ibid., §33, p. 182. 
 62See Christine Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge 




 (1) Consistency with the “general conception of justice.” This means 
that “all social values—liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and 
the social bases of self-respect—are to be distributed equally unless an 
unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone’s advan-
tage.”63 Let us assume that the unequal protections of liberty and physi-
cal integrity from nonuniformed combat are to everyone’s advantage. 
The next two requirements keep nonideal permissions from being merely 
consequentialist in their pursuit of ideal conditions. 
 (2) “Order of action” constraints. Priorities in nonideal theory must 
reflect the priority relations of ideal theory in its “order of action,” such 
that nonideal theory must first focus on realizing conditions required for 
the priority of equal liberties to apply, then on those required for fair 
equality of opportunity, and so forth. In this case, it means that securing 
the basic liberties (including physical integrity through civilian immu-
nity) cannot be delayed in the pursuit of economic gains, for example, 
land distribution. Whether a rebel group would run afoul of this require-
ment will vary case by case, of course, but if its complaint is economic 
rather than physical, then nonuniformed combat would not be permitted, 
nor would the beleaguered civilians be allowed to give up their immunity 
in service to the rebel cause. 
 (3) Consistency with the spirit of ideal theory. Rawls’s “special” con-
ception of justice helps tell us which of the many nonideal options is 
closest to the ideal, that is, the least bad.64 While this constraint operates 
in different ways with every case, the spirit of ideal theory requires “fi-
delity to law” and respect for the fundamental values of autonomy and 
freedom. The lack of transparency in sub rosa conscription (as described 
in the section on public goods) is blatantly inconsistent with the spirit of 
ideal theory. In order to exhibit a Kantian respect for persons consistent 
with the spirit of ideal theory, individuals must be able to substantively 
exercise their autonomy and give meaningful consent as much as possi-
ble under the nonideal conditions at hand. This, in turn, is only feasible 
when conditions are as transparent as they can be.  
 Third, in cases in which consent may be explicit, a public plebiscite 
on this matter could never be reliable even in the best-case scenario. Ci-
vilians would of course agree to give up their immunity for fear of re-
taliation if they said otherwise. Even a secret ballot in which no one 
could identify dissenting individuals would not solve this problem, be-
cause any result that does not give the rebels their desired outcome is 
                                                                                                             
University Press, 1996), pp. 147-51; Tamar Schapiro, “Kantian Rigorism and Mitigating 
Circumstances,” Ethics 117 (2006): 32-57; and Robert S. Taylor, “Rawlsian Affirmative 
Action,” Ethics 119 (2009): 476-506. 
 63Rawls, A Theory of Justice, §11, p. 54. 
 64See Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends, p. 148. 
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dangerous for everyone. There is only one correct answer to a plebiscite 
on this question, and it is better for people to ensure that the vote is 
overwhelmingly in favor of the proposition, in order to minimize a re-
taliatory search for dissenters. 
 Furthermore, there is no way for the opposing soldiers to reliably 
identify dissenters to this democratic mandate on nonuniformed combat. 
Because the externalities of nonuniformed combat mean that a civilian 
decision to accept this risk can only be made as a group, not by particular 
individuals—as dissenters cannot “opt out” of this arrangement—the 
minority must accept this infringement on its rights to immunity. In addi-
tion, a majority-determined civilian policy on nonuniformed combat is 
particularly problematic when considering the effect on children and 
other minors. They, too, are harmed—perhaps most of all, as rebels often 
use children as shields if they know their opponents are loath to shoot 
and risk killing the children—but because of their age or other incapac-
ity, they cannot consent to undertake this danger. 
 Majorities, even substantial majorities, should not be permitted to 
impose those types of risks on others. As I have argued, neither rebel 
groups nor governments are allowed to employ any method they want in 
pursuit of a cause, and this does not change if it is the civilians who have 
chosen to place themselves in this kind of danger. A democratic mandate 
depriving people of their civilian immunities does not make doing so any 
more legitimate. This is not any ordinary political or social directive, but 
rather one that imposes great risks on people’s lives. A minority could 
not be legitimately made to accept a democratic mandate to use babies as 
ammunition or to submit to torture, for example, and neither can it be 
required to accept nonuniformed combat by a majority. Following from 
earlier arguments about formation of political entities, some collective 





Not wearing a uniform or its equivalent in preparation for or during 
combat should always be illegal, with no exceptions for extenuating cir-
cumstances. Two remaining potential objections to this principle both 
mistakenly conflate jus in bello and jus ad bellum. The first claims that it 
is the unjust side in the conflict (whichever that may be), rather than the 
nonuniformed combatants per se, who forces civilians to become targets 
of attack and give up their immunity. (If the party without meritable 
cause is inherently incapable of just behavior in combat and is thus re-
sponsible for all unjust battlefield conduct, this makes jus in bello de-
pendent on jus ad bellum. It would follow, then, that the opposite is 
true—all combat actions of the party with just cause are similarly just.) 




The second objection worries that resource-poor groups fighting against 
despotic regimes for greater freedom will rarely succeed without nonuni-
formed combat and that justice will be ill-served by this restriction. His-
tory is replete with many such noble causes, such as French partisan re-
sistance against Nazi occupation or the American Revolution; without 
guerrilla and nonuniformed combat, the Americans might not have won, 
and the world would certainly have been poorer for it. Both objections 
are frequently followed by a consequentialist claim that the party in the 
right therefore should receive special advantage (in the form of nonuni-
formed combat) in order to increase the chances of justice prevailing. 
 Jus in bello and jus ad bellum are, however, separate questions and 
one does not determine the other. It does not hold that any tactic em-
ployed in the service of a just cause is also just. A party unambiguously 
in the right is not necessarily warranted in using whatever means are at 
its disposal in order to win—for example, we would not countenance the 
execution of small children in the pursuit of a just war. So neither should 
we necessarily blame an unjust strategy (nonuniformed combat) on the 
party with the unjust cause. This welding of jus in bello with jus ad bel-
lum also sometimes appears in the broader just war literature.65 And al-
though jus ad bellum violation “triggers” nonideal conditions, it does not 
make combat behavior a morality-free zone for the party in the right. 
This collapses valuable moral distinctions and makes nonideal theory 
consequentialist by deeming rightful whatever means bring about a right-
ful end. In order to maintain consistency with the spirit of ideal theory, 
there must be limits on combat behavior. We cannot accept that the ends 
justify the means by sanctioning use of nonuniformed combat as a moral 
matter, even if the ends are very good ones. 
 However much one may want to condone the just rebel movements in 
their entirety, it does not detract from the wrongness of their engagement 
in nonuniformed combat. This does not mean that everything about their 
missions was wrong. In practical terms, moral prohibition against non-
uniformed combat is problematic for revolutionary groups in the right 
who would otherwise never be able to succeed. I do not venture a com-
plete answer here, but one possibility—provided that the cause is truly 
just, essential, and otherwise hopeless—would be to engage in nonuni-
formed combat and then accept the punishments that are meted out. 
Rather than claim the full rights of uniformed combatants and POWs, 
they could take a page from the history of civil disobedience, accept the 
consequences, try to win the conflict, and hope that history vindicates 
their actions and forgives their wrongs. This is not to say that, in cases in 
                                                 
 65See, e.g., Jeff McMahan, “On the Moral Equality of Combatants,” Journal of Po-
litical Philosophy 14 (2006): 377-93. 
 Uniform Exceptions and Rights Violations 77 
 
 
which rebels with a just cause are fighting a stronger and unjust oppo-
nent, there are no considerations due to them based on the justice of their 
cause. Jus ad bellum matters, so these rebels may have legitimate claims 
on other countries to aid them, for example, but the means they employ 
while fighting must remain a separate issue.  
 Of course, arguing that nonuniformed combat is morally unacceptable 
will not eliminate it. A different scheme of protections and punishments 
for nonuniformed combatants under international law still needs to be 
developed, one that minimizes the incentive to blend in with noncombat-
ants. How the infraction should actually be punished is unclear and this 
article will not venture to define a punishment scheme. Penalties could 
range from completely stripping all nonuniformed (and therefore illegal) 
combatants of POW privileges and rights and requiring only that states 
treat those detainees within the scope of human rights law, to mitigating 
the punishments in various ways for some groups depending on the ex-
tenuating circumstances. And what of civilians who willfully aid sol-
diers, because they believe in the soldiers’ cause but do not want to bear 
all the risks of a soldier’s life? In addition to serving as nonuniformed 
decoys, they might carry messages or supplies, or even kill enemy sol-
diers. These “civilians” are just as guilty of exploiting the soldier/civilian 
distinction as nonuniformed combatants, and should be deterred accord-
ingly. There will always be cheating from both sides, soldiers and civil-
ians, and no matter what the punishment, this behavior will be difficult to 
discourage. What is essential, however, is that the moral characteristics 
and ensuing categorical distinctions first be recognized, so that the exact 
nature of the wrongs is clear. Only then can the relevant and proper legal 
punishments and incentives be created to best encourage compliance 
with moral demands.66 
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